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Therefore, the court was able to find an illegal element in the transactions
common to all members of the class, the price, and by equating unconscionability with fraud, was able to find a basis on which the attorney
general could litigate under the Consumer Fraud Act.
The Kugler decision offers a viable solution to the problems confronted by the low-income consumer in states which have a consumer
fraud act.
RICHARD D. RoSEN

LIABILITY OF A PHARMACIST FOR NEGLIGENTLY
DISPENSING ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES
Mr. and Mrs. Troppi sued their pharmacist, Mr. Scarf, alleging his
negligence in supplying tranquilizers in place of prescribed oral contraceptives which resulted in an unwanted eighth child.' The following
damages were sought: (1) Mrs. Troppi's lost wages; (2) medical and
hospital expenses; (3) pain and anxiety of pregnancy and childbirth;
and (4) the economic costs of rearing an eighth child. The trial court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
whatever damage plaintiffs suffered was more than offset by the benefit
of having a healthy child.2 On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals
held, reversed and remanded: The application of the benefit rule does
not, as a matter of law, prevent recovery for the expenses of rearing an
unwanted child. Moreover, the parents of such a child are not required
to place the child for adoption in mitigation of damages. Troppi v. Scarf,
31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
Although a pharmacist's liability for negligently providing the wrong
drug has long been recognized,8 no appellate court has expressly ruled on
the question of whether that liability extends to the consequences of
negligently dispensing oral contraceptives.' The question faced by the
Michigan Court of Appeals was not whether Scarf was liable for his
negligence, but whether the damages sought by the Troppis were compensable under established principles of tort law.' A court would only be
1. After a miscarriage ended her eighth pregnancy, Mr. and Mrs. Troppi consulted their
physician and decided to limit the size of their family. The physician prescribed an oral
contraceptive, Norinyl.
2. The trial court applied what is commonly known as the benefit rule. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939).
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Marshall, 47 Mich. 576, 11 N.W. 392 (1882). See also Hoder v.
Sayet, 196 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (sale of blood).
4. A jury in Los Angeles has awarded a California family $42,000 to support a six-yearold son born as a result of negligence by a defendant drug company in supplying sleeping
pills instead of prescribed oral contraceptives. The case is not officially reported. See Miami
Herald, Nov. 26, 1971, § A, at 16, col. 1.
5. The Michigan court is careful to note throughout its opinion that it is relying on
common law principles.
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called upon to review the precise question decided in the instant case if
the court could find that the defendant had breached a legal duty owed
the plaintiff which proximately caused the birth of the unwanted child.
There are, however, few precedent-setting cases which have been decided
on this particular point, and all of them have involved elective or therapeutic sterilization operations.
The sterilization cases have proceeded on various theories. In Christensen v. Thornby, the plaintiff's wife had been warned by her physician
that it would be dangerous for her to bear a second child, so the plaintiff
consented to a vasectomy which the defendant-surgeon represented as a
success. Sometime thereafter, however, the plaintiff's wife became pregnant and gave birth to a normal healthy child without mishap. The plaintiff sued the defendant for deceit, alleging as damages his own anxiety
as well as the considerable expense suffered both before and after the
birth of the child. In affirming the trial court's sustention of the defendant's demurrer, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the avowed
purpose of the operation was to save the wife from the dangers of pregnancy, rather than to prevent the financial burden of birth and support.
Since the wife survived the birth unharmed, the damages sought were
held to be merely incidental to the bearing of a child, and therefore, too
remote from the avowed purpose of the operation to warrant compensation.7
A similar result, based on different reasoning, was reached in Ball v.
Mudge." The plaintiff-husband, in that case, had undergone a vasectomy
because of the anticipated expenses incident to the birth and support of
a fourth child and because of an obstetrician's warning that his wife
should not risk a fourth Caesarean section delivery. After the operation
the plaintiff's wife became pregnant and delivered a normal baby by
Caesarean section. In a suit based on breach of warranty and negligence,
a verdict was returned for the defendant-surgeon. The Supreme Court of
Washington affirmed this decision and held:
As reasonable persons, the jury may well have concluded
that appellants suffered no damage in the birth of a normal,
healthy child, whom they dearly love, would not consider placing
for adoption and "would not sell for $50,000" and that the cost
incidental to such birth was far outweighed by the blessing of a
cherished child, albeit an unwanted child at the time of conception and birth.9
6. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Christensen].
7. No allegation was made by the plaintiff in Christensen that either the child or the
economic consequences of his birth were unwanted.
8. 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ball].
9. Id. at 250, 391 P.2d at 204. The statement reflects a more direct approach to the
problem than that taken by the court in Christensen, supra note 6. In the latter case, the
court appeared to ignore the claim of anxiety which the plaintiff alleged that he had suffered
notwithstanding his wife's successful delivery. Clearly the plaintiff could not have forseen
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The benefit rule, insofar as it has been applied to sterilization cases,
is rooted in the long-standing public policy which opposes contraception.'
The most frequently cited opinion involving the rule is Shaheen v.
Knight," where the plaintiff sued his physician for breach of a contract
to perform an elective sterilization operation.' 2 After finding that the defendant did breach the contract, the court stated:
Defendant argues . . . and pleads, that plaintiff has suffered no
damage. We agree with defendant. The only damages asked are
the expenses of rearing and educating the unwanted child. We
are of the opinion that to allow damages for the normal birth
of a normal child is foreign to the universal public sentiment of
the people.' 8
At the same time, other courts have categorically endorsed the
compensability of damages in sterilization cases. In West v. Underwood,4
a husband and wife sued for personal injuries to the wife and consequential damages to the husband which were occasioned by a physician's
failure to perform an agreed-upon sterilization operation at the same time
as the wife's second Caesarean section delivery. During a subsequent
operation undertaken to secure sterilization, complications arose for
which a third operation was needed. In reversing a nonsuit, the court
stated that should the plaintiffs prevail on the issue of liability, they
"were entitled to recover for all pain and suffering, mental and physical,
together with loss of services and any other loss or damage proximately
resulting from such negligence."' 5
The language in West appears broad enough to encompass any
injuries sustained as a result of a defective sterilization operation. Nevertheless, the luckless couple in West did not proceed on the theory of
seeking support for an unwanted child. The court limited its opinion accordingly, and consequently, the decision does not tarnish the precedent
value of cases denying support for unwanted children.' 0
that his wife would survive the birth unharmed. In Ball, supra note 8, however, this claim
was made and rejected via the benefit rule enunciated in the cited statement.
10. Individual perceptions of this adverse public sentiment may have retarded the development of more effective and reliable sterilization techniques. This may be especially true
in the medical profession which is responsible for pioneering developments in this area.
Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 415, 422 (1965).
11. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming County Ct. 1957) [hereinafter cited as Shaheen].
12. As distinguished from therapeutic, an elective sterilization operation is one which
is sought for reasons, usually economic, other than the protection of the wife's health. See
generally Note, The Birth of a Child Following an Ineffective Sterilization Operation as
Legal Damage, 9 UTAH L. Rv. 808 n.2 (1965).
13. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (Lycoming County Ct. 1957). The
court also rejected the plaintiff's claim for damages on the ground that he had refused to
place the child for adoption and held that the plaintiff could not keep the child and have
the doctor support it.
14. 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945) [hereinafter cited as West].
15. Id. at 326, 40 A.2d at 611.
16. See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 260 (1934); Shaheen v.
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The most modern and practical approach to negligent sterilization
was demonstrated in Custodio v. Bauer.17 In that case, Mrs. Custodio had
undergone a therapeutic sterilization operation, but later became pregnant
and gave birth to a normal healthy child. Suit was instituted against the
surgeon to recover damages, including the support of the unwanted child,
for negligence and breach of warranty. Expressly rejecting Christensen
and Shakeen, the California District Court of Appeal held that the compensation was not for the unwanted child, "but to replenish the family exchequer.. ." so that no member of the family is deprived by the new arrival
of his just share of the family income.' 8 In so holding, the California court
rejected the notion that the benefit of having a healthy child outweighs, in
every case, the detriment of negligent sterilization. 9
In the instant case, the Michigan court could easily have followed
the lead of California in Custodio and gone no further. Contraception,
however, is frought with moral and religious overtones which could not
be lightly cast aside. In reaching its decision that application of the benefit
rule does not preclude recovery for the expenses of rearing an unwanted
child, the Michigan court rejected the public policy argument which
forbids such damages. The court first noted that contraception has been
elevated to a constitutionally-protected "zone of privacy" within the
marital relationship.20 In a treatment which was more extensive than
that of the Custodio court, the Michigan court held that the complete
denial of a defendant's liability would be inconsistent with a tort scheme
designed to deter the negligent dispensing of drugs. 2' Furthermore, the
court recognized that in a society in which tens of millions of women
use oral contraceptives on a daily basis, it could not be accurately said
that public policy forbade the relief sought by the Troppis.2 2
Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming County Ct. 1957); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d
247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
An Illinois court has recognized, at least implicitly, that the birth of a child may be
something less than the blessed event referred to in Christensen and Shaheen. However, the
court, as did the New Jersey court in West, failed to touch upon the important policy questions which have served to bar plaintiffs from compensation. Doerr v. Villite, 74 II. App. 2d
332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
17. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Custodiol.
18. Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
19. The court concluded:
Where the mother survives without casualty there is still some loss. She must
spread her society, comfort, care, protection and support over a larger group. If
this change in the family status can be measured economically it should be compensable as the former losses.
Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
On facts similar to those in Custodio, one Florida court has chosen to follow the California lead in rejecting the contention that public policy precludes recovery for the normal
birth of a healthy child, but that court expressly avoided the question of damages. See
Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
20. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971), citing
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 254, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971).
22. "Those tens of millions of persons, by their conduct, express the sense of the community." Id. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
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The overriding benefit concept adopted by the trial court, as well as
by Washington and Pennsylvania courts in Ball and Shaheen, was likewise
rejected. However, the court stopped short of rejecting the benefit rule in
all cases." The rule, though, is flexible enough for courts to award
damages which correspond to the differing injuries that are sure to arise
in future cases involving the negligent dispensing of oral contraceptives.24
What is cast aside by the court in the instant case is the notion that, as
a matter of law, a child's services and companionship have a dollar value
equal to or greater than the economic cost of his support, the pain and
anxiety of pregnancy and birth, medical expenses, and the various other
elements of damage-real and potential. 5
Recognized in Troppi are the realities of modern life. No longer is a
child expected to make a marked contribution to the family income. 26 No
longer can it be said that the birth of a child reaps so substantial a benefit
upon his parents that no damages can be sustained in any circumstances
as a result thereof. There may be instances where the benefit does, in
fact, mitigate the harm, 27 but this will not always be the case.

The Michigan court also rejected the doctrine of mitigation and
provided an analysis of the doctrine and its utility in unwanted child
cases that is missing from the Washington 28 and Pennsylvania 29 cases.
The court's conclusion that no mother, wed or unwed, can reasonably
be required to place her child for adoption in mitigation of damages °
is based on its recognition of the distinction between avoidance of conception and disposition of the human organism after conception. 3 The
law recognizes that it is best for the child to be reared by its natural
parents. 2 Moreover, even if unplanned and unwanted, a newborn child
spawns "emotional and spiritual bonds which few parents can bring
themselves to break. '8 8 A fortiori, the tortfeasor must take the plaintiff
23. Under the benefit rule, if the defendant's tortious conduct confers a benefit to the
"same interest" harmed by his conduct, the dollar value of the benefit is subtracted from
the dollar value of the injury in determining the damages to be awarded. Id. at 255-56, 187
N.W.2d at 518; Burtraw v. Clark, 103 Mich. 383, 61 N.W. 552 (1894). See 22 Am. JUR. 2d
Damages § 204 (1965); C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 40 (1935).
24. The court observed in part:
What must be appreciated is the diversity of purposes and circumstances of the
women who use oral contraceptives .... [It is clear that in each case the consequences arising from the negligent interference with their use will vary widely. A
rational legal system must award damages that correspond with these differing injuries. The benefits rule will serve to accomplish this objective.
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 256, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971).
25. Id. at 255-56, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
26. Id. at 255-56, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
27. The possibility is strongly implied by the court in the instant case.
28. Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 250, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (1964).
29. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 46 (Lycoming County Ct. 1957).
30. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
31. The right to use contraceptives is constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). However, the performance of an abortion remains a

felony in most jurisdictions.
32. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 259, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
33. Id. at 257, 187 N.W.2d at 519.
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as he finds her and cannot insist that the victim of his negligence be
willing to sever the natural bonds of parenthood and place the child for
34

adoption .

The Michigan court found: that public policy favors compensation
such as that sought by the Troppis; that an unwanted child may result
in a net financial detriment rather than benefit; and that adoption is
not a reasonable mitigation requirement. Also, the court rejected the contention that the three items of damages together were so uncertain as to
render them unduly speculative. The court then struggled with the
question of approximating the costs of rearing the unwanted child 5 and
found that while there existed some uncertainty in applying the benefit
rule,"8 difficulty in determining the amount to be subtracted from gross
damages would not justify a complete denial of recovery. 7
Had the Troppi's problem been litigated a decade ago, recovery unquestionably would have been denied. However, neither people nor the
law by which they live remain static. As in virtually every aspect of life,
attitudes toward sex and sexual problems have undergone a social metamorphosis. Hopefully, as in the instant case, courts will follow changed
social attitudes. Clearly, a pharmacist has traditionally been liable for
negligence in filling a prescription for cold tablets or diet pills. The time
has now come for the pharmacist to be held to the same standard of care
in filling prescriptions for oral contraceptives. Any other view would place
a higher premium on the human sinus and wasteline than on the human
himself.
EDWARD R.

SHOHAT

LIABILITY OF CREDIT CARD ISSUER FOR FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE CREDIT TERMS AS REQUIRED BY THE
TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT
The plaintiff, a credit card holder, received a monthly statement
from the defendant-bank, a credit card issuer,' showing a new balance
and indicating that no finance charge had been incurred during the period
34. Id.

35. The court found that Mrs. Troppi's medical expenses, hospital bills, lost wages, and
the actual cost of rearing the child were computable with reasonable accuracy. Likewise, pain
and anxiety are elements of damages traditionally entrusted to the trier of fact. Id. at 260-62,
187 N.W.2d at 520-22.
36. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
37. Under applicable Michigan case law, difficulty in reaching a precise determination
of damages is no bar to recovery. See, e.g., Purcell v. Keegan, 359 Mich. 571, 103 N.W.2d
494 (1960), where recovery was permitted for unpaid compensation for overtime work. The
precise amount of work was not ascertainable in that case.
1. The parties were contractually related under a credit card plan, the Master Charge

Card Agreement.

